

THE EYES and EARS

"FIRST PUBLISHED 22nd JULY 1967 in Nui Dat, South Vietnam"



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
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The Detachment features at the National Vietnam Veterans Museum in Phillip Island...



Dr Andrew Kilsby, CEO, National Vietnam Veterans Museum, Phillip Island Vic 3925 sent in the following email to Bob Billiards to confirm what was being done using one of our photographs –

"Hi Bob,

I just wanted to confirm with you that the attached photo was from your personal collection?

The reason I am asking is that we are about to completely refurbish our Remembrance and Valour Gallery Honour Wall with the 521 names this week for Vietnam Veterans Day next Monday – and I wanted to use this image, minus the equipment which is taken out by photoshop, as the major backdrop on the wall behind the names. It makes a powerful picture to set up the wall and the names (the names will be on four Perspex panels stood out from the picture behind) - the use of the photo will of course be acknowledged on the wall. My apologies for not alerting you to this

earlier as we have been flat to the boards trying to get this done in time along with other various projects, but I hope that you will be OK for our plan to use the picture in this way?

The overall concept is shown attached (with the picture minus the radar tellurometer etc behind the soldier). On the left is a legend explaining unit and corps acronyms used on the wall.

I am sure that you will be very proud of the result at the museum and the major contribution your picture (albeit edited) will make to the overall effect.

Cheers

Andrew”

The photo they are using originates from the one below – **Bert Blink** forwarded the photos and emails as he states -



“Hi Paul

This is late but thought you might like to know given the VV Day context.

The original eMails is from Andrew Kilsby (I made the correction) sent to Bob & me

I have also attached a pdf of the mock up, obviously it is the survey equipment that will be photo-shopped out. A Det 131 honour.

Bert”

Steve Boutlis raised the question of who featured in the photo above - “Hi, mates. Is that Bruce, or Pete Fuhrmann in the attachment? Boots”

. Vietnam Veterans Day – 18th August, 2014...

Steve Boutlis got in promptly with – “Hope that you all had a very memorable Vietnam Veterans Day.

Our VVAA Sub-Branch had about 400 people at the short march and ceremony at the Caloundra RSL, and 200 at our luncheon that followed.

Met up with Leigh Hemming, one of the Pioneers, and four other 131 comrades who were in Nam with John Brewer about 1970. Photo of the four will be sent to Dicko.

Lots of photos of our day are on our website, vietnamvetssc.org.au

Keep well.

Boots’

Allen Morley reports in the Sydney “bash” while **Grahame Dignam** got a great photo -



Thirteen. Unlucky for some. But add a one after the three and good luck flows. At least it did at the Sydney VVD. Eight 131ers attended and subsequently scooped the raffle pool prizes. Eight raffle prizes ranging from a coffee machine to a \$50 dinner voucher.

We did attend the ceremony, which was addressed by Major General (Rtd) Simon Willis. Willis was a newly minted Duntroon graduate 2nd Lieutenant in an infantry Battalion in 1970-71; located in Nui Dat and the SVN bush.

At lunch those present, about 155 people, were entertained by Lucky Starr who sang a suite of songs identified with Elvis, Johnny Cash, Jim Reeves, Col Joye, Gary Puckett, Johnny O’Keefe etc. Lucky’s final tune was *I’ve Been Everywhere*. Perhaps the crowd favourite was *Muleskinner Blues*.

At the end of proceedings we all wandered out into the rain and headed to our respective abodes.

. Rieny Niewenhof - sent the following in to **Grahame Dignam** with regards to the event in Geelong – “Hi Dig, We had a great Vietnam Veterans day in Geelong on Sunday 17th August. Over 300 people attended and there were many politicians (wonder if it is a State election year?). Over 29 wreaths and many poppies were laid in remembrance of the 521 young Australians killed in Vietnam, and many who have died since. We had the 7/8 Royal Victorian Rifles Regiment as the Catafalque Party, the Geelong RSL Pipes and Drums band and the 28th Air Cadet Squadron as flag bearers. The weather was dry , but cold. (Let's move VV day out of August, especially in Victoria!) Bob Elworthy AM (Victorian President of the VVAA) gave the main address and impressed everyone with his reflective and honest presentation of what it was like for Vietnam veterans before, during and after the Vietnam war. Our march was presented in the local newspaper *The Geelong Advertiser*, (have a look at their website) ; we also took photos which I can post later, if desired. Unfortunately, apart from Russell Jackson (who rarely turns up) I was the only 131 Locator to be present.- wore the tie with pride.(All Locators seem to reside in NSW , Queensland or attend the Melbourne Shrine Remembrance). What a significant day in Geelong!! You guys might consider our invitation to hold a meeting/function at our VVA Centre in Geelong in 2015 or 2016?? Rieny President G & DVVAA”

. 1st Australian Task Force – (source: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/>) The following is the continuation of the account of Australian involvement in the South Vietnam conflict focusing on The Battle of Long Tan...

The information provided by Loc was consistent with that already known or suspected by 1 ATF, and other than a single battalion overwhelming Nui Dat, it was considered plausible. Yet Smith was adamant D Company had not been ambushed, believing the action to have been an encounter battle regardless of what may have been planned. He argued the troops in the rubber plantation had not been sited for an ambush, while the presence of 2,000 to 3,000 men so close to Nui Dat without prepared positions indicated they were still moving when the initial contact occurred. Equally, D Company had been left in possession of the dominant terrain and had not been drawn into a killing zone as the plantation offered too much concealment, no attempt had been made to cut them off from any relief force sent from Nui Dat, no artillery or mortars were fired into the engagement area, while the thick vegetation to the north prevented the Viet Cong from manoeuvring into a favourable position. He reasoned that if they had intended on mounting an ambush it would have been more effective near the original base plate position as that was the only location they could have been sure the Australians would investigate given they would have had no way of knowing D Company would move another 1,500 metres (1,600 yd) east after their handover with B Company where they contacted the 275th Regiment. Finally, communist ambushes were doctrinally completed in less than three hours, but Long Tan had continued for over four and as such Smith concluded that since the tactics used by the Viet Cong had been contrary to many of the principles of the area ambush the battle was unlikely to have been one. Arguably though too many facts are missing to make a conclusive assessment of Viet Cong intentions. To date though no definitive Vietnamese account of the battle is available, while those that exist are contradictory or unreliable. In 1988 several former PAVN officers, including Hong and Kiem, claimed no more than two battalions had been involved in the battle—less than half the most conservative Australian estimate. Kiem claimed the primary force had consisted of D445 Battalion reinforced by one company of North Vietnamese from Headquarters Military Region 7, a total of 720 men, while Hong stated one battalion from the 275th Regiment had also been involved, and that with D445 Battalion its total strength was 700 to 800 men. They believed an entire Australian battalion had been engaged along with two squadrons of APCs, and that the relief force had consisted of 1 ATF's second battalion, while the Australians had suffered hundreds of casualties, citing a BBC broadcast which reported 500 killed and 21 tanks destroyed. In contrast Viet Cong losses were claimed to have been significantly lower, with Kiem estimating the total number of dead and wounded as approximately 30, mainly from artillery fire. Hong agreed, stating the figure of 245 killed was exaggerated by a factor of ten. Yet this may only have been accurate for D445 Battalion, and was at odds with Viet Cong records later captured by US forces, with the diary of the commander of the 275th Regiment indicating that unit's losses as 500 men killed. However, total losses may have been even higher still, with 1 ATF uncovering documents during Operation Marsden in 1969 which listed casualties of 878 killed, died of wounds or missing and 1,500 wounded. Such claims also contradicted the Dong Nai history which stated both the 275th Regiment and D445 Battalion had been involved. Indeed the majority of the dead buried after the battle had been wearing green uniforms, and this, coupled with their weapons and equipment, indicated they were either main force Viet Cong or North Vietnamese. Of the three wounded prisoners one was from D445 Battalion and the other two were North Vietnamese who thought they were attached to the 45th Regiment, unaware their unit changed name to the 275th Regiment when operating in the south. According to them it was the artillery battalion of this regiment which had bombarded Nui Dat. Both Kiem and Hong claimed the plan had been to mortar Nui Dat to draw a reaction force into an ambush, not to attack the base itself. They confirmed the dual military and political aim, emphasising the disruption 1 ATF had caused by lodging at Nui Dat and the intention to affect Australian public opinion. The forced evacuation of Long Tan and Long Phuoc had curtailed the Viet Cong who regarded it as a liberated area, and it had been chosen as the ambush site to demonstrate to the local population they were still able to operate effectively despite the Australian presence. Hong explained that the ambush had been sprung within range of the artillery at Nui Dat because they had correctly assumed no Australian reaction force would move outside the cover it provided, and instead they planned on rapidly closing with and destroying it before artillery or air support could be brought to bear. According to Hong they had

planned to occupy prepared positions in the Long Tan rubber plantation and to destroy whatever force the Australians sent to locate the mortars following the attack on Nui Dat. A stop force had been placed to the east, while another was deployed to the south to hold the Australians in place, reasoning the thick undergrowth to the north would force them between the two. D445 Battalion was then to close the rear of the ambush, attacking from the north-west. A larger ambush would then have been staged outside artillery range along the withdrawal route subsequently used by 275th Regiment. Meanwhile, the 274th Regiment had been positioned north of Binh Ba astride Route 2 to ambush US forces should they attempt to relieve 1 ATF. Hong later expressed amazement the Australians could consider the battle a victory: "How can you claim a victory when you allowed yourselves to walk into a trap that we had set? Admittedly we did not finish the job, but that was only because time beat us and your reinforcements arrived. I mean you did not even attempt to follow us up. How can you claim a significant victory from that sort of behaviour?"

While the plan outlined by Hong had many of the components of an annihilation ambush, and drawing the enemy out of his base areas was a standard communist tactic, a number of weaknesses were evident, including the lack of a means of neutralising the Australian artillery, the absence of indirect fire weapons in the ambush, and the comparatively small size of the ambushing force. Equally the plan to site a second ambush outside artillery range would have been ineffective as the Australians were unlikely to proceed that far unless their guns had followed. Hong believed the ambush failed because the soldiers at the front—those which faced 11 Platoon—fired before the entire Australian force had entered the killing zone, while it should have been opened from the rear against 12 Platoon.

Had D Company been attacked from the rear the battle would indeed have been more like an ambush, and they would have been in immediate danger, while it would likely have been irrelevant if the forward Viet Cong troops fired first as the Australians were already well into the plantation. Yet they had been unable to co-ordinate such a manoeuvre and D445 Battalion had more than three hours from the initial contact to close the gap at the rear and failed to do so. Regardless, a number of issues cast doubt on this version of events. Firstly, if the Viet Cong had been in the plantation on 17 and 18 August preparing an ambush they would likely have been identified by the patrols from A or B Company, 6 RAR. Secondly, the alleged size of the force is questionable as just 700 men would have been insufficient to be certain of success, while according to communist doctrine it would have required more than a regiment to achieve overwhelming force. In the end the reaction of the Viet Cong indicted they had not detected D Company's presence in the rubber plantation until the first clash with 11 Platoon.

In 2005, Nguyen Nam Hung—deputy commander 274th Regiment—claimed the Viet Cong had indeed intended to destroy 1 ATF and liberate Ba Ria province. Hung stated that a two-phased offensive had been conceived, with the Viet Cong first planning to draw the Australians into the open and destroy them in an ambush, and then attack the weakened base at Nui Dat. Ultimately though their goal had been political and the capture of Nui Dat was not itself considered important. According to the official D445 Battalion history, the officers of the units involved had met in early August to finalise plans for the attack.

The account claimed that following the mortar attack on 16/17 August, the force had formed up in a 3-kilometre (1.9 mi) wide semi-circle at 10:15 on 18 August to lie in wait, with the 275th Regiment given the "middle battle" position and tasked with springing the ambush, while other units from the 275th Regiment and one company from D445 Battalion occupied the "front block" position near the village of Long Tan, and two companies from D445 Battalion under the command of Major Sau Thu had been tasked with occupying the "back block" position to encircle the Australians by sweeping beneath their "tail" and destroying them. In support, the 80-strong Vo Thi Sau militia company, most of them women, was located nearby to help drag away the wounded following the battle. Thu later confirmed he had been ordered to lure the Australians out of Nui Dat, kill as many as possible, capture their weapons, and then overrun the base. Yet this explanation also suffers from inconsistencies. In particular, the delay of over a day between the mortar attack and the battle suggests another purpose, and it is possible it may have served to test the Australian reaction and the speed with which counter-battery fire could be directed against them in preparation for a full-scale attack. While Vietnamese statements consistently maintain an ambush was planned at Long Tan, whether they also intended on attacking Nui Dat remains uncertain. The fact a large Viet Cong force had not been identified in the rubber plantation prior to midday on 18 August suggests no such force was there, and consequently they could not have been occupying an ambush position waiting for the arrival of the reaction force from Nui Dat. Regardless, it seems likely the 5th Division did intend ambushing the Australians, although they seem to have been ill-prepared to do so due to a lack of co-ordination which occurred following the morning of 17 August and the selection and occupation of the intended site. As a result they appear not to have been ready when D Company entered the plantation and were likely somewhere on its eastern edge instead. The Viet Cong were probably still conducting their reconnaissance and establishing the ambush in the vicinity of where the rubber met the jungle when the battle occurred and it seems likely the Australians upset their plan, perhaps moving faster than the ARVN and US troops they had previously fought. What followed then appears to have been an encounter battle as the two advancing forces clashed on open ground in a meeting engagement. An alternative explanation is that the Australians may have approached from an unexpected direction, physically dislocating the ambush. Indeed, according to Thu "...we didn't know how many... [the Australians] had in Nui Dat. We tried to draw them out... We thought they would go one way but... [they] went the wrong way and came behind us." In July 2006, Sabben and Buick visited the battlefield for a television story on 60 Minutes, where they met Nguyen Minh Ninh, former vice-commander D445 Battalion. Minh told them: "You won. But we won also. Tactically and militarily you won—but politically, we won. In this battle you acted out of our control—you [escaped] from our trap." According to journalist Cameron Stewart it was the first time a senior North Vietnamese officer had admitted being defeated at Long Tan.

Although D Company ultimately prevailed they would have been defeated were it not for the timely arrival of the cavalry and the availability of significant artillery support. The battle had come close to disaster for the Australians and brought home the dangers of a dismounted platoon or company being overwhelmed by a larger force. A number of deficiencies had been evident in 1 ATF's preparation and response to the battle. As the fighting began there had been no ready reaction force available at Nui Dat, and this resulted in a lengthy delay reinforcing D Company. After Long Tan a rifle company with armoured support was dedicated to this role, on standby to respond to an attack or exploit any opportunity. Meanwhile, the Viet Cong had been armed with weapons at least equal to those used by the Australians. Most had carried modern Soviet assault rifles, as well as a large quantity of ammunition, which allowed them to sustain a high rate of fire. In contrast, the quantity of ammunition carried by the Australians had been insufficient, and following the battle the minimum load was increased to 140 rounds per rifle and 500 for each machine-gun. Equally the aerial resupply of D Company had been delayed because there were no prepacked ammunition holdings available. This also changed, while in future rounds would also be supplied loaded in magazines for quick use. The Viet Cong had also employed 60 mm mortars, but they were no longer standard equipment for Australian rifle companies, and although battalions were issued 81 mm mortars they were controlled by Support Company. Such weapons would afford integral fire support in situations where their opponents had closed within the safety distance of the artillery, and consideration was given to their re-issue. Yet the added weight would limit the ability of sub-units to patrol and M-79 grenade launchers were issued instead, while a number of APCs were modified as mortar carriers.

The magnitude of the battle and its proximity to Nui Dat shocked the Australians, and later it was suggested Jackson had either suspected a Viet Cong regiment was nearby or that after being presented with SIGINT suggesting its presence he had refused to accept it. Yet while a number of indicators of the coming action were evident after the battle, in reality no one had forecasted it. Despite 547 Troop detecting a transmitter from the 275th Regiment moving west towards Nui Dat, such intercepts were unable to predict Viet Cong intentions with certainty, while patrols through the area also failed to find it. Regardless, Jackson had responded by maintaining patrols at company strength when outside Line Alpha, while ensuring a level of base security. However, Townsend had not been given access to this intelligence and some officers were later critical of the restrictions placed on its availability. Although it would not have altered the requirement for a company-sized patrol it might have changed the way the battle had been fought, and following Long Tan both battalion commanders were regularly briefed on such intercepts. Meanwhile, the value of patrolling in depth and in sufficient strength to disrupt Viet Cong efforts to concentrate their forces was reinforced and while no change to the pattern of Australian operations occurred, when a significant engagement was possible patrols would be required to be a minimum of a company, while platoons and companies would be required to operate close enough to rapidly support each other to prevent them becoming isolated. Lastly, the command relationship between the infantry and APCs when operating together had been problematic during the battle and changes to standard operating procedures were implemented to provide clearer direction in such circumstances.

Subsequent operations.

A week following the battle US II FFV launched a large-scale corps-sized sweep of Phuoc Tuy on 23 August, known as Operation Toledo. The operation saw the deployment of two brigades of the US 1st Division, the US 173rd Airborne Brigade, the US 1/26th Marine Battalion and two South Vietnamese Ranger battalions in an attempt to destroy the 274th and 275th Regiments. 1 ATF involvement included both 5 RAR and 6 RAR and supporting units. The operation lasted until 8 September and despite the intensity of the previous fighting little contact occurred, with no evidence of a large force having been in the area uncovered. Badly conceived, the operation failed to trap the Viet Cong, while 5 RAR's involvement resulted in only two Viet Cong killed, one wounded and one captured without loss, although a number of tunnels were discovered in Long Tan village and subsequently destroyed. In the months that followed 1 ATF conducted a number of search and destroy, village cordon and search, and route security operations in an attempt to further extend its control, and to separate the local people from the influence of the Viet Cong. Such operations usually resulted in contacts between the Australians and small groups of Viet Cong, while during cordon and search operations of Binh Ba and Hoa Long a number of villagers suspected of sympathising with the communists were apprehended and handed over to the South Vietnamese authorities. Several search operations were also conducted by the Australians in areas suspected of containing Viet Cong base camps, and these often resulted in the discovery of recently used and quickly evacuated camps, hospitals and logistic bases which had then been destroyed. Meanwhile, 5 RAR and 6 RAR continued an extensive patrolling and ambushing program around the task force base at Nui Dat.

By December 1966 some Australian officers had begun to reassess their operational aims. Warr argued they should move away from conventional operations and focus instead on population control and disrupting communist supply lines and freedom of movement. Assessing that 1 ATF did not have the strength to destroy the Viet Cong forces then in Phuoc Tuy with just two infantry battalions, he favoured cordon and search operations to eliminate the cadres and block the supply of rice from the villages. On 7 January 1967, Jackson was replaced as Commander 1 ATF by Brigadier Stuart Graham, and he subsequently approved Warr's proposed concept of operations. Two days later 5 RAR conducted a cordon and search of Binh Ba, screening 1,500 villagers and interrogating 591. Nine Viet Cong were captured, while five draft dodgers were also detained, with the operation concluding by mid-afternoon without a shot fired. The Australians considered the operation a complete success and its results were seen to vindicate their evolving tactics, techniques and procedures. In the following months 5 RAR continued to develop cordon and search procedures as 1 ATF extended its influence, with such operations weakening the Viet Cong infrastructure and

removing a number of villages from their control. In this manner 1 ATF continued to operate independently in Phuoc Tuy Province, pursuing their own counter-insurgency campaign. Yet differences of opinion between Australian and American methods increasingly produced friction; impatient with the Australian approach, in early-1967 Westmoreland complained to Commander Australian Forces Vietnam, Major General Tim Vincent, demanding a more aggressive approach. However, the Australians were convinced deliberate patrolling techniques were proving effective, and such urgings went mostly unheeded.

In February 1967 1 ATF focused on the Dat Do area and south-east Phuoc Tuy, initiating a program of conventional operations and pacification, with 5 RAR concentrating on cordon and search and civic action against the village cadres, while 6 RAR was tasked with search and destroy missions targeting D445 Battalion. During the first week 6 RAR conducted ambushes along Route 23 between Dat Do and the Suoi Tre river, pre-empting Viet Cong attacks in the area during the Tet holiday. The results were modest, and they suffered a number of casualties from a misplaced fire mission from the 161st Battery, RNZA which killed four and wounded 13, including Kirby who was among the dead. On 13–14 February 5 RAR and South Vietnamese forces completed a cordon and search of An Nhut, west of Dat Do, apprehending 14 Viet Cong suspects, five sympathisers, two deserters and a draft dodger. The Australians again suffered heavy casualties after the officer commanding C Company, his second-in-command, and the artillery forward observer were killed by an unrecorded ARVN mine. Regardless, these operations met with some success, and over a six-day period the battalion captured 40 Viet Cong. Yet even as Graham continued to refine his strategy the Viet Cong struck, and this sudden initiative would force the Australians into the type of conventional engagement Westmoreland had been advocating during Operation Bribie on 17–18 February 1967. During a hard fought battle at close range the Viet Cong lost heavily, yet the disciplined force matched the Australians as both sides stood their ground, inflicting casualties on the other before falling back. 1 ATF sustained its heaviest casualties in the war to that point, losing 16 men killed and 55 wounded in a single week. For the first time in nine months of operations the number of Australians killed in battle, or from friendly fire, mines or booby traps, had reversed the task force's kill ratio and they appeared to have lost the initiative.

This is the end of the series...we'll go hunting for more this month.

. John Blake identifies Craig Castona –

“Giddy,

That chap in the photo mis-named as Craig is Jorge Colomb, a Puerto Rican. Another of my good mates at the time. I have heard or seen nothing of him since. JB”



Craig Castona, known to us when he came with John to the Plaque dedication Ceremony in May 2014 has a very interesting backdrop – no doubt the same “beast”.




Committee members:
President – Allen Morley, **Vice President** – Bert Blink, **Treasurer/Secretary** – Grahame Dignam,
Public Officer – Victor Danko, **Webmaster** – Bob Billiards, **Research Officer** – Ernie Newbold,
Designs and Development Officer – Nick Proskurin, **Eyes & Ears Editor** – Paul Dickson
General members – Ian Amos, Ged Carroll George Lane.
Regional Representatives: **ACT** – Bert Blink, **Qld** – Terry Erbs, **SA** - Geoff Blackwell,
Vic (Melb) – Alan Adams, **WA** - Barry Guzder
<http://www.131locators.org.au>

Welcome – The Association has great pleasure in welcoming a group this time – **Peter Jackson** to the Association fold.

. Upcoming Events Calender –

131 Locators Association Committee Meeting Date: Tuesday, 23rd September, 2014 at 1100hrs

Venue: Canley Heights RSL & Sporting Club, 26 Humphries Rd., Canley Heights for directions -
<http://www.canleyheightsrsl.com.au/contact-us/> You're all welcome

Presidential perambulations:

On the train trip home following Vietnam Veterans' Day in Sydney I chatted with Jim Fitzgerald, one of the 131 Pioneers. One bit of information I knew was that Jim is an accountant, now retired. But it was interesting to compare notes on life both after National Service and after retirement.

This conversation set me thinking. We learnt about what other Nashos did before being they were signed up, during recruit and corps training, as well as during our time in SVN. And also who had their pay made up! Our 131 Locators Association profiles give us a perspective on what people did after their two year sentence, or longer in the case of ARA or reserve soldiers. However, we are not sure exactly how each of us fills in their time post retirement. Travel, grey nomading, grandkid care, volunteering, mens' sheds, reading, medical appointments and procedures, TV watching and computers are all seemingly popular. I know that *Eyes and Ears* Ed, Dicko, is a cat carer in Mexico as well as an aspiring golfer.

But what, Dear Reader, are you now doing in all that spare time on your hands?

For me there is the dog to walk of a morning, then the pool to maintain and three mornings each week a gym journey. Recently I spent ten days in NZ on grandkid refereeing during school holidays. I seem to spend a lot of time focussing on my wife's list of jobs for me to do, in the absence of a bucket list. No golf or fishing or bike riding or round Australia touring for me.

Let's here from individual members of how they now occupy their retirement time. It would be of interest to all our readers.

Regards Allen

. web Performance...

If you've got more photos that you want added, just send them to: - Paul Dickson – web Photos three-zero@hotmail.com – **BUT DON'T FORGET TO ADD TITLES/NAMES ETC.**

. Birthdays in September...

Here's a Locator we haven't mentioned before what – **Philp Mulgrew** – he'll be turning 66 on 2nd – shame we don't know where he is – HAPPY BIRTHDAY Phil!!

September	Name	Regt No	YOB	SVN In	SVN Out	Comments
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1	ERIC THOMPSON Sgt.	44153	1948	18 02 1968	18 02 1969	
	" "			13 05 1971	04 06 1971	VISIT
2	PHILIP MULGREW	3411756	1948	29 04 1968	07 05 1969	
3	MILLS BUCKLEY	16950	1937	20 05 1966	03 03 1967	† 02.04.07
3	PETER SAINT	45033	1949	04 11 1970	29 07 1971	
6	JOHN DELLACA	3791355	1945	29 01 1968	28 01 1969	
7	STEVE BOUTLIS	3787962	1945	02 01 1967	27 09 1967	
7	GARY BESTER	3411737	1948	08 01 1968	03 12 1968	
7	IVAN MILLS S/Sgt.	213051	1934	31 01 1969	05 11 1969	
8	WILLIAM EDWARD	2789911	1947	21 02 1969	21 02 1970	
12	BARRY NUGENT	1411039	1945	03 01 1967	12 12 1967	
12	LARRY BRIDGE	2786506	1946	15 03 1968	18 03 1969	
12	PHILIP JOHNS	4719086	1946	16 09 1968	18 03 1969	
12	STEVEN VOSS	1735605	1948	29 04 1970	18 03 1971	
12	KEVIN GEOGHEGAN	219351	1951	16 12 1970	02 06 1971	131
	" "			02 06 1971	23 12 1971	HQ AFV
13	VICTOR CLAXTON	4410991	1948	17 01 1968	23 12 1968	
14	MERV DART	37821	1942	03 01 1967	09 01 1968	† 2001
14	FRANK IPSA	3786657	1945	04 05 1967	12 12 1967	
14	RUSSELL HEWITT	2792435	1948	03 06 1970	04 03 1971	
16	FRANK PEPPER	216683	1948	12 09 1967	17 09 1968	† 27.12.89
16	RONALD DEAN	215527	1944	20 05 1966	29 04 1967	
16	BRIAN BLACK	2786469	1946	27 11 1967	26 11 1968	† 18.01.11
16	ALLEN WHEATLEY	2790305	1947	16 09 1969	04 06 1970	
17	JOHN BLAKE	1731550	1945	04 05 1967	13 12 1967	
17	BARRY GUZDER	5714500	1945	10 06 1967	21 05 1968	
17	MAURICE ARCH	43350	1937	02 01 1967	14 11 1967	
17	ERNEST GALLOWAY	216708	1948	08 01 1968	22 04 1968	
18	BOB WILSON	3791425	1946	27 11 1967	19 11 1968	
18	JIM LAWLER Sgt.	28523	1936	18 12 1967	03 12 1968	
19	ROBERT DAVID GOW	61644	1944	20 05 1966	03 03 1967	
19	HUBERT ANDREWS	2790121	1947	21 02 1969	21 02 1970	
19	WESLEY HINDMARSH	2791313	1947	30 09 1969	13 08 1970	
19	PHILLIP WAPSHOT	3793468	1947	27 11 1969	18 03 1970	
21	GARRY LEPLAW	217182	1948	05 02 1968	11 02 1969	† 06.12.83
22	IAN BUBB	2792358	1948	13 05 1970	11 03 1971	RAEME
23	GREGORY TOMMASI 2Lt.	3791966	1946	10 03 1970	25 08 1970	131
	" "			25 08 1970	11 03 1971	4 Fd Regt.
	GORDON CAMPBELL GUNN	16915	1944	11.03.69	11.03.70	† 23.09.13
24	BOB. BILLIARDS	2785702	1946	12 09 1967	17 09 1968	
24	GEOFFREY CARTHEW	2793339	1949	03 06 1970	09 06 1971	
26	KEN. McNAMARA	2783740	1945	04 05 1967	12 12 1967	
26	JOHN DAVIES Sgt.	29351	1937	07 10 1966	30 04 1967	
26	RONALD BOALER	130230	1948	20 02 1970	11 02 1971	
28	LEONARD WALKER	3798942	1949	16 12 1970	30 06 1971	Det 131 † Unknown
	" "			30 06 1971	30 10 1971	12 Fd Regt.

Ed – 12 blokes not highlighted – can we find these blokes before next year?

. **Locator Profiles** – we've received 125 and we've sent out 124. Ed – I will get the one in reserve out in the next week – I promise – sorry Pete!

. **Located...**

Have a look at the Association's web site - <http://www.131locators.org.au> – you might find some lost mates or get in touch with us and see if we can for you.



131 Locators Association is always on the lookout for new financial members. With the establishment of the web site we continue to be burdened with the ongoing cost of maintenance etc and we need to be able to support this effort equally.


So, if you're a non-financial Associate receiving emails and the *Eyes & Ears* regularly you could bite the bullet and email **Grahame Dignam**: sectreas131locators@gmail.com and he could forward you the relevant forms to join.

Memberships are available for 1 or 5 years. Hope we hear from you?

Web site - <http://www.131locators.org.au/131locators/>

. Other related sites...

. Artillery Surveyors 131 Div Loc Bty...



ARTILLERY SURVEYORS 131 DIV LOC BTY

"Elements of 131 came wandering in from the bush"

(A quote whose origins are lost, yet the sentiments expressed will not be lost on many who served with 131 Div Loc Bty SVN.)

This website seeks to make contact with the Artillery Surveyors of 131 Div Loc Bty. We welcome your relevant contributions of photos, insights and observances so we might endeavour to expand

131 Artillery Surveying Vietnam record, beyond this window. Please use the [contacts page](#) for details:

<http://www.artillerysurveyors131.com.au/>

<http://www.artillerysurveyors131.com.au/operations/coburg.html>

. Locating , Surveillance & Target Acquisition Association...



LOCATING, SURVEILLANCE & TARGET ACQUISITION ASSOCIATION

The Eyes And Ears Of The Battlefield

...notes taken from the LS & TAA website – The next Meeting will be held on 26th October, 2014 at Paddington RSL. Members are cordially invited to attend.

Details of scheduled Committee meetings will be available in the next issue of the Association's Newsletter LOCREP.



Australian Artillery Association – www.australianartilleryassociation.com



ROYAL AUSTRALIAN ARTILLERY HISTORICAL COMPANY

www.artilleryhistory.org



Website link - <http://www.vvaa.org.au/>



. VETERAN'S AFFAIRS WEBSITE

The Dept of Veteran's Affairs has launched a new mental health initiative to assist veteran's experiencing the affects of mental illness and their families. Providing information and fact sheets about understanding mental illness, links and contact information for accessing support, and online resources for health professionals, this website focuses on helping veterans identify early warning signs of mental illness to effectively manage their mental illness and seek treatment. For more info or to access, please visit www.at-ease.dva.gov.au

. 1st Battalion 83rd Artillery...



Dedicated to the men of the 1st Battalion 83rd Artillery who served in Vietnam from 1966-1971. We left Fort Sill in October 1966 for Vietnam. We originally were at Bear Cat, Nui Dat and Xuan Loc. We later were in many other locations in Vietnam. We also welcome our Australian and New Zealand Allies to whom we owe so much. It is also dedicated to those members of the 1/83rd who did not return. We will never forget their sacrifice. Website: http://83rd_artillery.home.comcast.net/~83rd_artillery/

Editor contact email: three-zero@hotmail.com Ed – Paul 'Dicko' Dickson

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